Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Louis-Sidois, Charles; Musolff, Leon
• 署名单位: Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4658
• 发表日期: 2024-07-01
• 页码: 1305-1349
• 关键词: Vote buying; legislatures; political economy; D71; D72

摘要

We analyze a vote-buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately-drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When members vote simultaneously, the number of bribes is at least 50% larger than the number of votes required to pass the proposal (vote threshold). The number of bribes increases with the dispersion of the disutility distribution and all members are bribed with sufficient dispersion. A proportional increase in the number of members and the vote threshold leads to a less-than-proportional increase in capture cost, and the cost may increase with the vote threshold. With sequential voting and disutility distribution U[0,1], all members are bribed and bribes are equal. Finally, sequential voting increases capture cost in small committees and decreases it in large committees.