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作者：Mitkov, Yuliyan
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I endogenize the probability of self-fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The coordinating players' actions can be based on a sunspot state, which, unlike in the classic sunspot approach, is observed with a small, idiosyncratic noise (a private sunspot). I show how private sunspots, comb...
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作者：Combe, Julien; Nora, Vladyslav; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Nazarbayev University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify virtual prices for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly select a budget of virtual money at the beginning of...
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作者：Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I study t & acirc;tonnement processes in a matching market without transfers. In each period, schools set cutoffs, i.e., the preference ranks of the least preferred students they are willing to admit, and students accept their most preferred offers. Cutoffs are adjusted on the basis of demand-supply imbalances. A school's adjustment from one period to the next is moderate if it is bounded by the most recently observed imbalance at that school. I show that for any period in which all schools ad...
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作者：Wong, Yu Fu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies how a forward-looking decision maker experiments on unknown alternatives of correlated utilities. The utilities are modeled by a Brownian motion such that similar alternatives yield similar utilities. Experimentation trades off between the continuation value of exploration and the opportunity cost of exploitation. The optimal strategy is to continuously explore unknown alternatives and then exploit the best known alternative when the one being explored is found to be suffici...
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作者：Finster, Simon; Goldberg, Paul W.; Lock, Edwin
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Oxford; University of London; King's College London
摘要：In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense or maximize the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-op...
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作者：Principi, Giulio; Wakker, Peter P.; Wang, Ruodu
作者单位：New York University; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Waterloo
摘要：Comonotonicity (same variation) of random variables minimizes hedging possibilities and has been widely used, e.g., in Gilboa and Schmeidler's ambiguity models. This paper investigates anticomonotonicity (opposite variation (AC)), the natural counterpart to comonotonicity. It minimizes leveraging rather than hedging possibilities. Surprisingly, AC restrictions of several traditional axioms do not give new models. Instead, they strengthen the foundations of existing classical models: (a) linear...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Kuvalear, Aditya V.; Lipnowski, Elliot
作者单位：New York University; University of Essex; Yale University
摘要：We study project selection and development by a principal, interacting with two agents, each of whom wants his respective project selected. When the best choice is uncertain, keeping both projects alive gives the principal the ability to adapt her choice in the future, but implies an efficiency loss of effort being spent on the project finally not chosen. We show that a time-varying threshold rule is uniquely optimal: the principal selects the first project to achieve a sufficient lead. The op...
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作者：Sandmann, Christopher; Bonneton, Nicolas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Vanderbilt University
摘要：This paper proves the existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in the canonical search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of unmatched agents evolve endogenously over time. An equilibrium exists under minimal regularity conditions and for both paradigms considered in the literature: transferable and nontransferable utility. To address potential discontinuities in match opportunities across types, our analysis introduces a...
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作者：Bedard, Nicholas C.; Goeree, Jacob K.
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We establish the subgradient theorem for monotone correspondences: a monotone correspondence is equal to the subdifferential of a potential if and only if it is conservative, i.e., its integral along a closed path vanishes irrespective of the selection from the correspondence along the path. We prove two attendant results: the potential theorem, whereby a conservative monotone correspondence can be integrated up to a potential, and the duality theorem, whereby the potential has a dual whose su...
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作者：McAdams, David; Song, Yangbo
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：An innovation (e.g., new product or idea) spreads like a virus, transmitted by those who have previously adopted it. Agents update their beliefs about innovation quality based on private signals and when they hear about the innovation. We characterize equilibrium adoption dynamics and the resulting lifecycle of virally-spread innovations. Herding on adoption can occur but only early in the innovation lifecycle, and adoption eventually ceases for all virally-spread innovations. A producer capab...
