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作者：Bedard, Nicholas C.; Goeree, Jacob K.
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We establish the subgradient theorem for monotone correspondences: a monotone correspondence is equal to the subdifferential of a potential if and only if it is conservative, i.e., its integral along a closed path vanishes irrespective of the selection from the correspondence along the path. We prove two attendant results: the potential theorem, whereby a conservative monotone correspondence can be integrated up to a potential, and the duality theorem, whereby the potential has a dual whose su...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations...
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作者：Galichon, Alfred; Samuelson, Larry; Vernet, Lucas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Yale University; European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要：We introduce a notion of substitutability for correspondences and establish a monotone comparative static result. More precisely, we introduce the notions of unified gross substitutes and nonreversingness and show that if Q:P paired right arrows Q is a supply correspondence defined on a set of prices P, which is a sublattice of RN, and Q satisfies these two properties, then the set of equilibrium prices Q-1(q) associated with a vector of quantities q is an element of Q is a sublattice of P and...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling; Xu, Menghan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a profit-maximizing priority search program always induces the efficient level of market participation. The key insight underpinning our results is the non-monotonic relationship between the priority service premiu...
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作者：Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Columbia University
摘要：We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a revelation-principle result for settings in which a media...
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作者：Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long-lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when served. An agent can decide anytime whether to either join a queue of his choice or renege. I show that it is efficient to elicit agents' private information by offering a simple binary menu (i.e., two custo...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent-specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all agents choose the high action if their threshold is smaller than x and the low action otherwise. The random-utility (RU) dominant outcome x* is a maximizer of an integral of the distribution of thresholds. ...
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作者：Principi, Giulio; Wakker, Peter P.; Wang, Ruodu
作者单位：New York University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Waterloo
摘要：Comonotonicity (same variation) of random variables minimizes hedging possibilities and has been widely used, e.g., in Gilboa and Schmeidler's ambiguity models. This paper investigates anticomonotonicity (opposite variation (AC)), the natural counterpart to comonotonicity. It minimizes leveraging rather than hedging possibilities. Surprisingly, AC restrictions of several traditional axioms do not give new models. Instead, they strengthen the foundations of existing classical models: (a) linear...
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作者：Spiritus, Kevin; Lehmann, Etienne; Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris T.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Delft University of Technology; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule for taxpayers with multiple incomes and multiple unobserved characteristics. We identify smoothness assumptions and extensions of the single crossing conditions that enable the characterization of the optimum through variational calculus. Both the tax perturbation and mechanism design approaches yield identical results when the number of incomes equals the number of unobserved characteristics. Notably, the mechanism design approach requires ...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Tokyo
摘要：This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show...
