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作者：Xie, Haitian; Zhu, Ying; Shishkin, Denis
作者单位：Peking University; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The classic third degree price discrimination (3PD) model requires the knowledge of the distribution of buyer valuations and the covariate to set the price conditioned on the covariate. In terms of generating revenue, the classic result shows that 3PD is at least as good as uniform pricing. What if the seller has to set a price based only on a sample of observations from the underlying distribution? Is it still obvious that the seller should engage in 3PD? This paper sheds light on these funda...
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作者：Inostroza, Nicolas; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：University of Toronto; Northwestern University
摘要：We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action. The designer does not trust the agents to play favorably to her and evaluates any policy under the worst-case scenario. First, we show that the optimal policy removes...
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作者：Kamiya, Kazuya; Kubota, So
作者单位：Kobe University; Tohoku University
摘要：We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay-all equilibrium, and prove its existence. Each buyer pays all the money holding as a corner solution to the bargaining problem and each seller produces a positive amount of goods as an interior solution. The bargaining powe...
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作者：Adler, Matthew D.; Bossert, Walter; Cato, Susumu; Kamaga, Kohei
作者单位：Duke University; Universite de Montreal; University of Tokyo; Sophia University
摘要：Although sufficientarianism has been gaining interest as a theory of distributive justice in recent years, it has not been examined in the presence of risk. We propose an ex post approach to sufficientarianism that has a strong link to ex post prioritarianism. Both ex post criteria are based on an axiom that we refer to as prospect independence of the unconcerned, a natural extension of the independence axiom known from the literature that focuses on situations with no risk. We characterize a ...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Tokyo
摘要：This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A group of agents with a common prior receive informative signals about an unknown state repeatedly over time. If these signals were public, agents' beliefs would be identical and commonly known. This suggests that if signals were private, then the more correlated they are, the greater is the commonality of beliefs. We show that, in fact, the opposite may be true. In the long run, conditionally independent signals may achieve greater commonality of beliefs than correlated signals.
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In repeated principal-agent problems and games, more outcomes are implementable when performance signals are privately observed by a principal or mediator with commitment power than when the same signals are publicly observed and form the basis of a recursive equilibrium. We investigate the gains from nonrecursive equilibria (e.g., review strategies) based on privately observed signals. Under a pairwise identification condition, we find that the gains from nonrecursive equilibria are small: th...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Gottlieb, Daniel; Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Southern California; Princeton University
摘要：We study how the separation of time and risk preferences relates to a property called stochastic impatience. We show that, within a broad class of models, stochastic impatience holds if and only if risk aversion and the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution are sufficiently close. In the models of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (1995), stochastic impatience is violated for all commonly used parameters. Our result also provides a simple, one-question test for the separ...
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作者：Agrawal, David R.; Bagh, Adib; Mardan, Mohammed
作者单位：University of Kentucky; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：The conventional wisdom is that a large jurisdiction sets a higher tax rate than a small jurisdiction. We show that this result arises due to simplifying assumptions that imply that tax-base sensitivities are equal across jurisdictions. When more than two jurisdictions compete in commodity taxes, tax-base sensitivities need not be equal across jurisdictions and a small jurisdiction can set a higher tax rate than a large jurisdiction. Our analysis extends to capital and profit taxes, and, more ...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：New York University; Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University
摘要：We study the standard reputation model with a long-run (LR) player facing a sequence of short-run (SR) opponents, with one difference: the SR players are uncertain about the monitoring structure, while the LR player knows it. We construct examples where the standard reputation result breaks down: Even if there is a possibility that the LR player is a commitment type who always plays the action to which he wants to commit, there exist bad equilibria in which the LR player gets payoffs substanti...
