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作者：Agrawal, David R.; Bagh, Adib; Mardan, Mohammed
作者单位：University of Kentucky; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：The conventional wisdom is that a large jurisdiction sets a higher tax rate than a small jurisdiction. We show that this result arises due to simplifying assumptions that imply that tax-base sensitivities are equal across jurisdictions. When more than two jurisdictions compete in commodity taxes, tax-base sensitivities need not be equal across jurisdictions and a small jurisdiction can set a higher tax rate than a large jurisdiction. Our analysis extends to capital and profit taxes, and, more ...
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作者：Mitkov, Yuliyan
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I endogenize the probability of self-fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The coordinating players' actions can be based on a sunspot state, which, unlike in the classic sunspot approach, is observed with a small, idiosyncratic noise (a private sunspot). I show how private sunspots, comb...
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作者：Chan, Lester T.
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all equilibrium selection criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and then induces them to ac...
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作者：McAdams, David; Song, Yangbo
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：An innovation (e.g., new product or idea) spreads like a virus, transmitted by those who have previously adopted it. Agents update their beliefs about innovation quality based on private signals and when they hear about the innovation. We characterize equilibrium adoption dynamics and the resulting lifecycle of virally-spread innovations. Herding on adoption can occur but only early in the innovation lifecycle, and adoption eventually ceases for all virally-spread innovations. A producer capab...
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作者：Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Kominers, Scott Duke; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many economic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scaling results from such models by removing these finiteness assumptions. Our sufficient conditions are on the theorem statement only, and not on its proof. This results in short proofs, and even allows us to use the same argument to scale similar theorems that were proven using distinctly different tools. We demonstrate the ver...
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作者：Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I study t & acirc;tonnement processes in a matching market without transfers. In each period, schools set cutoffs, i.e., the preference ranks of the least preferred students they are willing to admit, and students accept their most preferred offers. Cutoffs are adjusted on the basis of demand-supply imbalances. A school's adjustment from one period to the next is moderate if it is bounded by the most recently observed imbalance at that school. I show that for any period in which all schools ad...
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作者：Wong, Yu Fu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies how a forward-looking decision maker experiments on unknown alternatives of correlated utilities. The utilities are modeled by a Brownian motion such that similar alternatives yield similar utilities. Experimentation trades off between the continuation value of exploration and the opportunity cost of exploitation. The optimal strategy is to continuously explore unknown alternatives and then exploit the best known alternative when the one being explored is found to be suffici...
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作者：Inostroza, Nicolas; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：University of Toronto; Northwestern University
摘要：We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action. The designer does not trust the agents to play favorably to her and evaluates any policy under the worst-case scenario. First, we show that the optimal policy removes...
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作者：Kamiya, Kazuya; Kubota, So
作者单位：Kobe University; Tohoku University
摘要：We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay-all equilibrium, and prove its existence. Each buyer pays all the money holding as a corner solution to the bargaining problem and each seller produces a positive amount of goods as an interior solution. The bargaining powe...
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作者：[Anonymous]
摘要：We study how the separation of time and risk preferences relates to a property called stochastic impatience. We show that, within a broad class of models, stochastic impatience holds if and only if risk aversion and the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution are sufficiently close. In the models of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (1995), stochastic impatience is violated for all commonly used parameters. Our result also provides a simple, one-question test for the separ...
