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作者：Laiho, Tuomas; Murto, Pauli; Salmi, Julia
作者单位：Aalto University; Hanken School of Economics
摘要：We introduce a collective experimentation problem where a continuum of agents choose the timing of irreversible actions under uncertainty and where public feedback from the actions arrives gradually over time. The leading application is the adoption of new technologies. The socially optimal expansion path entails an informational trade-off where acting today speeds up learning but postponing capitalizes on the option value of waiting. We contrast the social optimum to the decentralized equilib...
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作者：Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Kominers, Scott Duke; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many economic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scaling results from such models by removing these finiteness assumptions. Our sufficient conditions are on the theorem statement only, and not on its proof. This results in short proofs, and even allows us to use the same argument to scale similar theorems that were proven using distinctly different tools. We demonstrate the ver...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations...
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作者：Galichon, Alfred; Samuelson, Larry; Vernet, Lucas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Yale University; European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要：We introduce a notion of substitutability for correspondences and establish a monotone comparative static result. More precisely, we introduce the notions of unified gross substitutes and nonreversingness and show that if Q:P paired right arrows Q is a supply correspondence defined on a set of prices P, which is a sublattice of RN, and Q satisfies these two properties, then the set of equilibrium prices Q-1(q) associated with a vector of quantities q is an element of Q is a sublattice of P and...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling; Xu, Menghan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a profit-maximizing priority search program always induces the efficient level of market participation. The key insight underpinning our results is the non-monotonic relationship between the priority service premiu...
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作者：Rappoport, Daniel
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receivers prior belief about the sender's evidence induces more skepticism, i.e., induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver's prior belief expects more evidence t...
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作者：Chan, Lester T.
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all equilibrium selection criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and then induces them to ac...
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作者：Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Columbia University
摘要：We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a revelation-principle result for settings in which a media...
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作者：Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long-lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when served. An agent can decide anytime whether to either join a queue of his choice or renege. I show that it is efficient to elicit agents' private information by offering a simple binary menu (i.e., two custo...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent-specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all agents choose the high action if their threshold is smaller than x and the low action otherwise. The random-utility (RU) dominant outcome x* is a maximizer of an integral of the distribution of thresholds. ...
