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作者：de Castro, Luciano; Galvao, Antonio F.; Nunes, Daniel
作者单位：University of Iowa; Michigan State University; Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA)
摘要：This paper studies a dynamic quantile model for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty, in which the decision maker maximizes the tau-quantile of the stream of future utilities, for tau is an element of (0,1). We present two sets of contributions. First, we generalize existing results in directions that are important for applications. In particular, the sets of choices and random shocks are general metric spaces, either connected or finite. Moreover, the future state is not exclusively dete...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's previous purchases and sets a price. We compare the cases where previous prices are observable to sellers with the case where they are not. We show that, in both cases, more signal precision is counterbalan...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Muller, Stephan; Pourbabaee, Farzad; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Gottingen; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.
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作者：Gavan, Malachy James; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA
摘要：Implementation theory is concerned with the existence of mechanisms in which, at each state of the world, all equilibria result in outcomes that are within a given social choice correspondence (SCC). However, if agents make mistakes, if their preferences or the solution concept are misspecified, or if the designer is limited in what can be used as punishments, then it may be desirable to insist that also deviations result in acceptable outcomes. Safe implementation adds this extra requirement ...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：An extension rule assigns to each fractional tournament x (specifying, for every pair of social alternatives a and b, the proportion x ab of voters who prefer a to b) a random choice function y (specifying a collective choice probability distribution for each subset of alternatives), which chooses a from {a,b} with probability x ab.There exist multiple neutral and stochastically rationalizable extension rules. Both linearity (requiring that y be an affine function of x) and independence of irr...
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作者：Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
摘要：How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of une...
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作者：Spiritus, Kevin; Lehmann, Etienne; Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris T.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Delft University of Technology; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule for taxpayers with multiple incomes and multiple unobserved characteristics. We identify smoothness assumptions and extensions of the single crossing conditions that enable the characterization of the optimum through variational calculus. Both the tax perturbation and mechanism design approaches yield identical results when the number of incomes equals the number of unobserved characteristics. Notably, the mechanism design approach requires ...
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作者：Ball, Ian; Kattwinkel, Deniz
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; University College London
摘要：We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing ...
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作者：Liu, Zehao; He, Ping; Xie, Chengbo
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Tsinghua University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Liquidity requirements for commercial banks improve risk-sharing for depositors. Nevertheless, shadow banks, issuing securities with lower liquidity, operate outside such regulatory constraints. In an economy featuring shadow banks with a constant level of liquidity for shadow bank securities, higher liquidity requirements lead to a reduction in aggregate liquidity provision, owing to regulatory arbitrage incentives. Conversely, when the liquidity of shadow bank securities decreases with the m...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Roorda, Berend; Yang, Jingni
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Twente; University of Sydney
摘要：We introduce and analyze expected balanced uncertain utility (EBUU) theory. A prior and a balanced outcome-set utility characterize an EBUU decision maker. Conditional on a reference or balancing value, the latter assigns a utility to each outcome-set. The decision maker associates with each act, its envelope, the minimal measurable mapping from states to outcome-sets that contains the act. She then (implicitly) ranks an act according to the balancing value at which the expected balanced utili...
