Symmetric reduced-form voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lang, Xu; Mishra, Debasis
• 署名单位: Shandong University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5400
• 发表日期: 2024-05-01
• 页码: 605-634
• 关键词: Reduced-form voting; unanimous voting; ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility; monotone reduced form; D82

摘要

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.