Contracting over persistent information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Renmin University of China; University of Queensland; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Adelaide; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5056
• 发表日期: 2024-05-01
• 页码: 917-974
• 关键词: Dynamic; CONTRACT; INFORMATION; revelation; disclosure; sender; receiver; persuasion; C73; D82

摘要

We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or the agent perfectly learns the state.