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作者：Queiros, Francisco
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：This paper studies the interplay between asset bubbles and product market competition. It offers two main insights. The first is that imperfect competition creates a wedge between interest rates and the marginal product of capital. This makes rational bubbles possible even when there is no overaccumulation of capital. The second is that when providing a production subsidy, bubbles stimulate competition and reduce monopoly rents. I show that bubbles can destroy efficient investment and have amb...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such environments with a mix of rational and data-driven bidders, and we allow for correlation across bidders in the signal distributions about the ex post values. After reviewing the working of the approach...
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作者：Passadore, Juan; Xandri, Juan Pablo
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：Dynamic policy games feature a wide range of equilibria. This paper provides a methodology for obtaining robust predictions. We focus on a model of sovereign debt, although our methodology applies to other settings, such as models of monetary policy or capital taxation. Our main result is a characterization of distributions over outcomes that are consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium conditional on the observed history. We illustrate our main result by computing-conditional on an obser...
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作者：Chen, Yu; Doyle, Matthew; Gonzalez, Francisco M.
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of Waterloo
摘要：We analyze a model in which workers direct their search on and off the job and employer-worker match productivities are private information. Employers can commit neither to post contracts such that wages are a function of tenure nor to disregard counteroffers. In this context, potential employers who do not observe workers' productivity in their current matches use wages as a signal of workers' willingness to switch jobs. In turn, this implies that the wage contracts that employers post in the...
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作者：Nora, Vladyslav; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Nazarbayev University; Lancaster University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We characterize optimal transfers showing that agents who are more popular than their friends receive preferential treatment. Our main result is that under mild conditions complete core-periphery networks deli...
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作者：Toomas, Hinnosaar
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an ear...
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr; Kolotilin, Anton
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is Lipschitz continuous.When the objective depends on the posterior belief through a set of moments, the price function induces prices for posterior moments that solve the corresponding dual problem. Thus, o...
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作者：Pivato, Marcus; Tchouante, Elise Flore
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have generalized Hurwicz preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are almost-objectively uncertain in the sense that asymptotically, all agents almost agree about the probabilities of the underlying events. We introduce a Pareto axiom, which applies only to asymptotic preferences along such almost-objective sequence...
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作者：Nebel, Jacob M.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. ...
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作者：Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex ...
