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作者：Auster, Sarah; Pavoni, Nicola
作者单位：University of Bonn; Bocconi University
摘要：We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave the principal unaware of relevant options. By doing so, the agent increases the principal's cost of distorting the agent's choices and increases the principal's willingness to grant him higher informat...
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作者：Liang, Annie; Madsen, Erik
作者单位：Northwestern University; New York University
摘要：Big data gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's quality is initially unknown but is forecast from an observable outcome. We show that measurement of a new covariate has a systematic effect on the average effort exerted by agents, with the direction of the...
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作者：Han, Xiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and to randomize over deterministic mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex ante. We propose and study the concept of ex ante fairness for random allocations, extending some key results in the one-sided and two-sided matching markets. It is shown that the set of ex ante fair random allocations forms a complete and distributive lattice und...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We offer a simple analysis of the problem of choosing a statistical experiment to optimize the induced distribution of posterior medians or, more generally, q-quantiles for any q is an element of (0,1). We show that a single experiment-the q-quantile matching experiment-implements all implementable distributions of posterior q-quantiles, with different distributions spanned by different selections from the sets of posterior q-quantiles. A dense subset of implementable distributions of posterio...
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作者：Achim, Peter; Knoepfle, Jan
作者单位：University of York - UK; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：A principal incentivizes an agent to maintain compliance and to truthfully announce any breaches of compliance. Compliance is imperfectly controlled by the agent's private effort choices, is partially persistent, and is verifiable by the principal only through costly inspections. We show that in principal-optimal equilibria, the principal enforces maximum compliance using deterministic inspections. Periodic inspection cycles are suspended during periods of self-reported noncompliance, during w...
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作者：Banerjee, Soumen; Chen, Yi-Chun; Sun, Yifei
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; National University of Singapore; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel classification of lies according to their refutability with evidence, the mechanism requires only two agents, accounts for mixed-strategy equilibria, and accommodates evidentiary costs. While monetary t...
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作者：Bohren, J. Aislinn
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper explores how the persistence of past choices creates incentives in a continuous time stochastic game involving a large player (e.g., a firm) and a sequence of small players (e.g., customers). The large player faces moral hazard and her actions are distorted by a Brownian motion. Persistence refers to how actions impact a payoff-relevant state variable (e.g., product quality depends on past investment). I characterize actions and payoffs in Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) for a fixed...
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作者：Tatur, Tymon
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm that everybody will want to follow. Depending on technological assumptions, the approach yields the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the equal monetary split, and other bargaining solutions. Se...
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作者：Pablo Rincon-Zapatero, Juan
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In this paper, we develop a framework to analyze stochastic dynamic optimization problems in discrete time. We obtain new results about the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation through a notion of Banach contractions that generalizes known results for Banach and local contractions. We apply the results obtained to an endogenous growth model and compare our approach with other well-known methods, such as the weighted contraction method, countable local contractions, and...
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作者：Kocourek, Pavel; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Duisburg Essen; University of Zurich; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Toronto
摘要：Evidence suggests that consumers do not perfectly optimize, contrary to a critical assumption of classical consumer theory. We propose a model in which consumer types can vary in both their preferences and their choice behavior. Given data on demand and the distribution of prices, we identify the set of possible values of the consumer surplus based on minimal rationality conditions: every type of consumer must be no worse off than if they either always bought the good or never did. We develop ...
