Coalitional manipulability in school choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moreno-Garcia, Emma; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
• 署名单位: University of Salamanca; Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE6816
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: college admissions; mechanisms; STABILITY; allocation

摘要

We compare the degree of coalitional manipulability across stable school-choice mechanisms. Although no stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for all school choice contexts, we show that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the least manipulable by coalitions, whereas the school-optimal stable mechanism is the most coalitionally manipulable. These results still hold when students can only report truncated preferences, when the set of coalitions is limited, or when schools cannot be declared unacceptable as long as there are more available seats than students. In contrast, if there is a shortage of seats and students have no outside options, the school-optimal stable mechanism can be less manipulable by coalitions than the student-optimal stable mechanism.