Choice or competition: Does integration benefit everyone?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE6468
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: School choice; college admissions; strategy-proofness; affirmative-action; allocation; STABILITY; constraints; MARKET; MONOTONICITY; assignment

摘要

Matching markets are often fragmented, organized at a small local level. While integration of matching markets may lead to welfare gains by expanding choice, it may also harm some market participants by increasing competition for the same resources. We show that every good mechanism fails the monotonicity requirement that no individuals be hurt by integration. Then we provide characterization results that identify conditions under which monotonicity becomes compatible with other desirable properties of matching mechanisms.