Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru; Hofbauer, Josef
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; Princeton University; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• 发表日期: 2008-06-01
• 页码: 155-192
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; perfect foresight dynamics; supermodular game; strategic complementarity; stochastic dominance; potential; monotone potential

摘要

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a supermodular normal formgame. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer, then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction. A simple example of a unanimity game with three players is provided where there are multiple globally accessible states for a small friction.