Contagion through learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• 发表日期: 2008-12-01
• 页码: 431-458
• 关键词: Similarity; learning; contagion; case-based reasoning; global games

摘要

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of contagion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the outcomes generally differ.