A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koriyama, Yukio; Szentes, Balazs
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• 发表日期: 2009-06-01
• 页码: 227-252
• 关键词: Voting; information aggregation; costly information

摘要

This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k* - 2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.