Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandholm, William H.
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE505
• 发表日期: 2010-01-01
• 页码: 27-50
• 关键词: Evolutionary game dynamics; ESS

摘要

We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.