Coalition formation under power relations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piccione, Michele; Razin, Ronny
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• 发表日期: 2009-03-01
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: POWER; coalition formation; STABILITY

摘要

We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order, which incorporates a notion of robustness to variable power relations. We provide a complete characterization of strongly stable social orders.