Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ordonez, Guillermo L.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1207
• 发表日期: 2013-09-01
• 页码: 653-700
• 关键词: Reputation; global games; risk-taking; fragility

摘要

Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, at an aggregate level, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers who have intermediate and good reputations, magnifying otherwise small economic shocks.