A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peski, Marcin; Wiseman, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1512
• 发表日期: 2015-01-01
• 页码: 131-173
• 关键词: Stochastic games; folk theorem

摘要

We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually rational payoff sets for this environment, and we prove a folk theorem under imperfect monitoring. Our setting differs significantly from the case considered in previous literature (Dutta 1995, Fudenberg and Yamamoto 2011, and Horner et al. 2011) where players become very patient. In particular, the set of equilibrium payoffs typically depends on the initial state.