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作者：Bosmans, Kristof; Decancq, Koen; Ooghe, Erwin
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Antwerp; KU Leuven
摘要：We provide an axiomatic justification to aggregate money metrics. The key axiom requires the approval of richer-to-poorer transfers that preserve the overall efficiency of the distribution. This transfer principle-together with the basic axioms of anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, and a version of welfarism-characterizes a standard social welfare function defined over money metric utilities.
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作者：Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton
摘要：An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I pr...
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作者：Phuong Le
作者单位：Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with singleminded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG), that is individually rational, incentive compatible, and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG works by first truncating valuations at budgets, and then implementing standar...
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; Llavador, Humberto
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson, 1976 and Fellman, 1976, according to which progressive and only progressive income taxesin the sense of increasing average tax rates on incomeensure a reduction in income inequality. This result has been criticized on the grounds that it ignores the possible disincentive effect of taxation on work effort, and the resolution of this critique has been a longstanding problem in public finance. This paper p...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：McGill University; European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Ranking by rating consists in evaluating the performances of items using exogenous rating functions and ranking these items according to their performance ratings. Any such method is separable: the ordering of two items does not depend on the performances of the remaining items. When performances belong to a finite set, ranking by rating is characterized by separability and a property of consistency; this characterization generalizes to the infinite case under a continuity axiom. Consistency f...
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作者：Ke, Shaowei
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We characterize axiomatically a stochastic choice model, the consistent-mistakes model (CMM), that describes an error-prone decision maker's choices. In contrast to random utility models, CMMs generate closed-form choice probability. Under the axioms, we uniquely identify from the choices an expected utility function that represents the decision maker's true preference and a propensity function that describes how likely an alternative is to be chosen. We introduce a measure of error-proneness ...
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作者：Jonsson, Adam; Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Lulea University of Technology; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper presents an infinite-horizon version of intergenerational utilitarianism. By studying discounted utilitarianism as the discount factor tends to one, we obtain a new welfare criterion: limit-discounted utilitarianism (LDU). We show that LDU meets the standard assumptions of efficiency, equity, and interpersonal comparability, but allows us to compare more pairs of utility streams than commonly used utilitarian criteria, including the overtaking criterion and the catching-up criterion...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Columbia University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanismsincluding top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial order), and their randomized variantsproduce a dist...
