An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a noncompromising type

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kambe, Shinsuke
• 署名单位: Gakushuin University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3158
• 发表日期: 2019-07-01
• 页码: 849-886
• 关键词: War of attrition; unique equilibrium

摘要

This paper studies an N-person war of attrition that needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, may the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition change over time. We introduce the possibility of a noncompromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and when the war of attrition ends quickly. As the leading example, we study how a group selects a volunteer in a dynamic setting.