Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Wenzhang
• 署名单位: Zhejiang University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4640
• 发表日期: 2022-11-01
• 页码: 1847-1895
• 关键词: Collusion; bidding rings; first-price auctions; repeated games; D82

摘要

In the context of repeated first-price auctions, we explore how a bid-rigging cartel can simultaneously overcome the difficulty of soliciting truthful private information about valuations and the difficulty of enforcing its internal mechanism. Focusing on the class of trigger-strategy collusive agreements, we explicitly characterize the optimal collusive agreement for any given discount factor. Making use of the characterization, we also explore how a long-run seller can use a reserve price to fight the cartel.