The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schlegel, Jan Christoph
• 署名单位: City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4405
• 发表日期: 2022-05-01
• 页码: 801-839
• 关键词: Trading networks; full substitutability; imperfectly transferable utility; competitive equilibrium; indivisible goods; frictions; lattice; rural hospitals; C78; D47; D52; L14

摘要

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.