How to sell in a sequential auction market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hendricks, Kenneth; Wiseman, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4768
• 发表日期: 2022-11-01
• 页码: 1451-1471
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; auctions; competing mechanisms; D82; C73

摘要

We characterize an optimal mechanism for a seller with one unit of a good facing N >= 3 buyers and a single competitor who sells another identical unit in a second-price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features transfers from buyers with the two highest valuations, allocation to the buyer with the second-highest valuation, and an allocation rule that depends on the two highest valuations. It can be implemented by a modified third-price auction, and it raises significantly more revenue than would a standard second- or first-price auction with a reserve price.