Contingent Prizes in Dynamic Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70019
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: optimal-design; procurement; feedback

摘要

Firms and government agencies increasingly use online contests to find solutions to problems. These contests allow players to make multiple attempts, and their progress is tracked on a real-time public leaderboard. Although the contests are dynamic, contest sponsors miss the opportunity to dynamically shape players' incentives, as they award the entire prize pool based only on players' final rankings. We propose the use of contingent prizes that depend on the game's history to incentivize players throughout the contest. We present evidence from two methodologies-a structural model and an RCT-showing that contingent prizes can significantly improve contest outcomes.