Consumer-Minded Informational Intermediary and Welfare Losses

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Xu, Wenji; Yang, Kai Hao
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong; Yale University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70050
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Certification; disclosure; LIMITS

摘要

This article examines the welfare implications of third-party informational intermediation. A seller sets the price of a product that is sold through an intermediary, who discloses information about the product to consumers. In a model where the intermediary is consumer-minded-has a payoff that depends on both the seller's revenue and the consumer surplus, we show that total welfare may decrease in the Pareto sense, as the intermediary's consumer-mindedness increases. Furthermore, we show that consumer-mindedness emerges endogenously when a revenue-maximizing intermediary is forward-looking and the consumer base is increasing in past consumer surplus.