Asymmetric Platform Oligopoly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peitz, Martin; Sato, Susumu
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70008
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: horizontal mergers; COMPETITION; networks; MARKET

摘要

We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within-group and cross-group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms' quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be extended to partial user participation.