Information Disclosure in Preemption Races: Blessing or (Winner's) Curse?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bobtcheff, Catherine; Levy, Raphael; Mariotti, Thomas
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12492
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: games

摘要

Firms receiving independent signals on a common-value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner-take-all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strategically select their disclosure policies, a moderate subsidy for disclosure induces a low correlation between firms' policies, and thus maximizes welfare.