Price Setting on a Network

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hinnosaar, Toomas
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70035
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; Aggregative games; mergers; EFFICIENCY; CONTRACTS; upstream; monopoly; channel; GOODS

摘要

I study price setting within a network of interconnected monopolists. Some firms possess stronger commitment or bargaining power than others, enabling them to influence the pricing decisions of other firms. Although it is well-understood that multiple marginalization reduces both total profits and social welfare, I show that strategic interactions within the network exacerbate the marginalization problem. Individual profits are proportional to a new measure of network centrality, defined by the equilibrium characterization. The results underscore the importance of network structure in policy considerations, such as mergers or trade policies.