Health service gatekeepers
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Malcomson, JM
署名单位：
University of Oxford
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.2307/1593698
发表日期：
2004
页码：
401-422
关键词：
摘要：
Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too-weak incentives to investigate cost further when the expected cost of treatment is greater than the benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too-strong incentives when the expected cost is less than the benefit. Giving patients the choice between a gatekeeper with an incentive contract and one without is unstable. With one scenario, patients always prefer the latter. With another, patients have incentives to acquire information that makes incentive contracts ineffective.
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