Using return policies to elicit retailer information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arya, A; Mittendorf, B
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/1593711
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 617-630
• 关键词: demand uncertainty; monopoly; exploration; COMPETITION; QUALITY; firm

摘要

We show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions. Roughly stated, the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in. lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions. A retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms. As a consequence, a retailer is less inclined to misstate market conditions. By serving as an. additional control instrument, a return policy reduces the manufacturer's need to ration (cut) production.