Careerist judges and the appeals process

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, G
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 275-297
• 关键词: determinants; cascades; prestige; COURT; LAW

摘要

I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to be creative, i.e., to inefficiently contradict previous decisions.