Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Shavell, S
署名单位：
Harvard University
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
发表日期：
2005
页码：
63-77
关键词：
摘要：
Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve incentives to reduce risk when insurers can observe levels of care but dilute incentives when they cannot observe levels of care. In the latter case, compulsory liability insurance may be inferior to asset requirements.