Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Streb, Jochen
• 署名单位: University Hohenheim
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00069.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 364-379
• 关键词: Incentives; MYTH

摘要

This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost-plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed-price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from information rents and high-risk premiums. This regulatory course undermined the credibility of the regulatory commitment, thereby weakening the incentives of the fixed-price contracts still in use.