Vertical restraints and horizontal control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Innes, Robert; Hamilton, Stephen F.
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00058.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 120-143
• 关键词: resale price maintenance; discounts

摘要

This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below-cost manufacturer pricing for the dominant brand(s). Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand seeks to control the retail pricing of a supermarket's private label, and for convenience stores, where a gasoline provider seeks to control the retail pricing of an in-store composite consumption good.