The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sweeting, Andrew
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00086.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 710-742
• 关键词: model; differentiation; COORDINATION

摘要

Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers, although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect. Coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets.