Performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank-order tournaments: field evidence and implications for tournament design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boudreau, Kevin J.; Lakhani, Karim R.; Menietti, Michael
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12121
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 140-165
• 关键词: inducement prizes; INNOVATION; contests; INFORMATION; incentives; auction; awards; entry; OIL

摘要

Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities, precisely conforming to theoretical predictions. Most participants respond negatively, whereas the highest-skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interpret a number of tournament design policies (number of competitors, prize allocation and structure, number of divisions, open entry) and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer.