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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Taub, Bart
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要：We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information public versus privateand of what firms learn aboutcommon versus private valuesaffect equilibrium outcomes. Firm outputs weigh private information about private values by more than common values. Thus, prices contain more i...
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作者：Bagnoli, Mark; Watts, Susan G.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand compet...
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作者：Ayres, Ian; Banaji, Mahzarin; Jolls, Christine
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We investigate the impact of seller race in a field experiment involving baseball card auctions on eBay. Photographs showed the cards held by either a dark-skinned/African-American hand or a light-skinned/Caucasian hand. Cards held by African-American sellers sold for approximately 20% ($0.90) less than cards held by Caucasian sellers. Our evidence of race differentials is important because the online environment is well controlled (with the absence of confounding tester effects) and because t...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Schwartz, Marius
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Georgetown University
摘要：This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost-based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost-based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumer...
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作者：Melitz, Marc J.; Polanec, Saso
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Ljubljana
摘要：We propose an extension of the Olley and Pakes () productivity decomposition that accounts for the contributions of surviving, entering, and exiting firms to aggregate productivity changes. We argue that the other decompositions that break down aggregate productivity changes into similar components introduce some biases in the measurement of the contributions of entry and exit. We apply our proposed decomposition to Slovenian manufacturing data and contrast our results with those of other deco...
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作者：Halac, Marina
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Warwick
摘要：A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable, informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts, as they induce higher investment ex ante: the principal invests not only to generate direct returns, but also to improve relational incentives....
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作者：Lee, Jinhyuk; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Ulsan National Institute of Science & Technology (UNIST); Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
摘要：This article proposes a computationally fast estimator for random coefficients logit demand models using aggregate data that Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (; hereinafter, BLP) suggest. Our method, which we call approximate BLP (ABLP), is based on a linear approximation of market share functions. The computational advantages of ABLP include (i) the linear approximation enables us to adopt an analytic inversion of the market share equations instead of a numerical inversion that BLP propose, (ii) A...
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作者：Ashenfelter, Orley C.; Hosken, Daniel S.; Weinberg, Matthew C.
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Drexel University
摘要：Merger efficiencies provide the primary justification for why mergers of competitors may benefit consumers. Surprisingly, there is little evidence that efficiencies can offset incentives to raise prices following mergers. We estimate the effects of increased concentration and efficiencies on pricing by using panel scanner data and geographic variation in how the merger of the brewers Miller and Coors was expected to increase concentration and reduce costs. All else equal, the average predicted...
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作者：Piccolo, Salvatore; Tedeschi, Piero; Ursino, Giovanni
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive pract...
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作者：Au, Pak Hung
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits ...
