An offer you can't refuse: early contracting with endogenous threat

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jullien, Bruno; Pouyet, Jerome; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12196
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 733-748
• 关键词: information; DYNAMICS

摘要

A seller has private information on the future gains from trade with a buyer, but the buyer has the option to invest to produce the good internally. Both the buyer and the seller can efficiently trade ex post under complete information. Despite the lack of information, the buyer sometimes gains by making an early contract offer to the seller. The early contract divides the different types of sellers according to their information, which renders the threat of producing the good in-house credible and enables the buyer to extract a larger share of the gains from trade. Several extensions are investigated.