Interviewing in two-sided matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Robin S.; Schwarz, Michael
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12193
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 835-855
• 关键词: college admissions; labor-market; STABILITY; search; networks

摘要

We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes classic one-to-one matching models by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: that is, if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.