The Competitive Conduct of Consumer Cooperatives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duarte, Marco; Magnolfi, Lorenzo; Roncoroni, Camilla
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12496
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 106-125
• 关键词: MARKET POWER; prices; nonprofit; oligopoly; BEHAVIOR; mergers; CHOICE; OWNERSHIP; COSTS; MODEL

摘要

Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperatives in the Italian supermarket industry act as profit-maximizing firms. We find no significant deviations from profit maximization. Based on a counterfactual exercise, even a mild degree of internalization of consumer welfare by the cooperatives that we study would yield consumer welfare gains comparable to the regulatory advantages they enjoy.