Product Development with Lurking Patentees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hovenkamp, Erik; Lemus, Jorge; Turner, John L.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12494
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 163-183
• 关键词: information; trolls; COSTS

摘要

Innovative product developers are often uninformed about relevant patents. Patentees may exploit this by strategically lurking-refraining from ex ante licensing in the hope that developers will unwittingly infringe, creating an opportunity for patent holdup. We contribute to the literature by introducing a framework to explore when strategic lurking is profitable and how it affects developers' technology decisions. We find that lurking is pervasive in equilibrium, and it may lead to inefficient investment or adoption of inferior technologies. Commitments to license patents on reasonable (or FRAND) terms can improve efficiency and benefit all parties.