Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Hanzhe
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12495
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 91-105
• 关键词: Reputation; incentives; disclosure

摘要

How does the politician's reputation concern affect information provision when the information is endogenously provided by a biased lobbyist? I develop a model to study this problem and show that the answer depends on the transparency design. When the lobbyist's preference is publicly known, the politician's reputation concern induces the lobbyist to provide more information. When the lobbyist's preference is unknown, the politician's reputation concern may induce the lobbyist to provide less information. One implication of the result is that given transparent preferences, the transparency of decision consequences can impede information provision by moderating the politician's reputational incentive.