CORRUPTION IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CHANDER, P; WILDE, L
署名单位：
Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90072-N
发表日期：
1992
页码：
333-349
关键词：
摘要：
We extend the game-theoretic model of Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) to allow for corruption in tax administration. In the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence. In fact, in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited. Moreover, when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue.
来源URL：