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作者：Walz, U; Wellisch, D
作者单位：Technische Universitat Dresden; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要：Given conditions of oligopolistic competition, the coordinated ban of direct export-promoting policies (e.g. in the EU or by GATT) increases the income of exporting countries. However, in the presence of environmental distortions, free trade can lead to ecological dumping in exporting countries. The question arises if free trade is still in the interest of exporting countries. We show that welfare-maximizing governments of exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their...
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作者：Corneo, G; Jeanne, O
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status. In equilibrium, the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends, in an identifiable way, on the number of consumers, and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism. The market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist. We derive some unconventional policy implications co...
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作者：Eeckhoudt, L; Gollier, C; Schlesinger, H
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：This paper examines how discrete tax brackets induce an otherwise risk-neutral firm to behave in a very specific risk-averse manner. We show how the firm's investment decisions relate to various factors, such as other firm revenue,tax rates, tax exemption levels and project risk. In particular, such a firm is shown to exhibit first-order risk aversion, with a possible zero demand for a risky investment, even when the expected excess return is positive. Firm behavior displays risk aversion that...
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作者：Hoyne, HW
摘要：Previous studies have examined whether the welfare system has contributed to the dramatic increase in single-parent families. This paper explores why the results in this literature are sensitive to the presence of state fixed effects. It considers one natural explanation, namely that the composition of the population differs across states in ways that are related to welfare program generosity. After controlling for individual effects the results provide no evidence that welfare raises the prop...
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作者：Kling, C; Rubin, J
作者单位：Iowa State University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：Intertemporal trading of emission permits (banking) is often identified as one of three promising market mechanisms for controlling pollution (along with averaging and trading). Surprisingly, the efficiency properties of permit banking systems have not been investigated. Using a simple optimal control model, this paper investigates firms' incentives for banking or borrowing emission permits and compares the emission and output streams firms would choose with the socially optimal solution. We f...
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作者：Francis, PJ
摘要：The intent of this paper is to raise the question of how and when externalities can arise in the market for vaccinations. Static and dynamic models of such markets are developed and compared. A special case in a continuous-time dynamic framework is examined and is found to be efficient, i.e. there is no externality. This is in contrast to the results from the static formulation, raising doubts about the suitability of a static approach. These results indicate that the question of whether there...
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作者：Sarte, PDG
摘要：This paper establishes the existence of a non-degenerate distribution of income in a simple dynamic economy when agents, who are heterogeneous in their rates of impatience, face a progressive tax system. In this dynamic setting, income inequality can vary positively with the degree of tax progressivity. Moreover, the inherent heterogeneity in agents' behavior can explain why measures of inequality, such as the standard deviation of income or Atkinson's Gini, tend to be dynamically much more sl...
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作者：Palmer, K; Walls, M
作者单位：Resources for the Future; Victoria University Wellington
摘要：Pricing trash collection and disposal services can be politically unpopular and may lead to increased illegal disposal of trash. Several studies have shown that deposit-refund systems can act like disposal charges without the illegal disposal problem and thus can generate an optimal amount of solid waste disposal. We assess the efficiency implications of an alternative policy currently in use in some states in the U.S. and considered at the federal level, recycled content standards. These are ...
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作者：Scotchmer, S
摘要：Competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry, for two reasons. First, there may be an ''integer problem'', as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding. Second, ''optimal'' groups may have different compositions from the population, and then even if there is no integer problem, it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups. I define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show tha...
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作者：Kirchsteiger, G; Puppe, C
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：This paper investigates the possibility of implementing an efficient provision of a public good through distortionary tax-subsidy policies in a simple one-shot game of voluntary contributions, Within the class of all linear tax-subsidy policies two cases are distinguished. The first is where individual taxes only depend on the sum of all other individuals' contributions. Although such policies may increase total supply of the public good, it is shown that the implementation of an efficient amo...
