On price-taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Scotchmer, S
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00008-X
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 75-88
• 关键词: clubs; nonanonymous crowding; small groups

摘要

Competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry, for two reasons. First, there may be an ''integer problem'', as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding. Second, ''optimal'' groups may have different compositions from the population, and then even if there is no integer problem, it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups. I define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium always exists in a sufficiently large economy. I focus on the optimal size of the economy rather than of clubs.