Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corneo, G; Jeanne, O
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00016-9
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 55-71
• 关键词: Consumption externalities; status-seeking; signalling

摘要

We develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status. In equilibrium, the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends, in an identifiable way, on the number of consumers, and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism. The market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist. We derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.