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作者：Ireland, NJ
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：The existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter-acting distortion. The question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule. The answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule, unless the rich are more concerned with status-seeking than the poor. On the other hand, status-seeking ...
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作者：Salas, R
作者单位：Complutense University of Madrid
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作者：Jack, W
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：The paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies pool high- and low-risk individuals. In a spatial product differentiation model, the normal forces of competition induce quality provision, but selection incentives induce insurers to under-provide quality. To offset selection incentives, the government can reimburse some of the insurers' costs. However, such a subsidy can in some cases reduce quality further, as well as discourage production efficiency. In su...
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作者：Lensink, R; Sterken, E
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：This paper analyzes equilibrium rationing on credit markets in the case of gains from waiting to acquire information about the future profitability of investment. We compare the competitive outcome with the socially optimal level of investment. We show that the opportunity to postpone investment changes the nature of the inefficiencies of the competitive outcome fundamentally. Without the option to wait, high risk firms tend to invest and the outcome is characterized by a situation of underinv...
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作者：Olsen, TE; Osmundsen, P
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Equinor; Universitetet i Stavanger; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in the two localisations. It is shown that the distortions in the MNE's real investment portfolio are determined by a trade-off between fiscal externalities and equity externalities, and that investments...
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作者：Berman, E; Bui, LTM
作者单位：Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The devolved nature of environmental regulation generates rich regulatory variation across regions, industries and time. We exploit this variation, using direct measures of regulation and plant data, to estimate employment effects of sharply increased air quality regulation in Los Angeles. Regulations were accompanied by large reductions in NOx emissions and induced large abatement investments for refineries. Nevertheless, we find no evidence that local air quality regulation substantially red...
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作者：Nosal, E
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of Waterloo
摘要：In most jurisdictions in the world, governments are allowed to expropriate private property. But a government's expropriation decision may be personally motivated and not in society's best interest. I propose a very simple tax and compensation scheme that implements the socially optimal allocation when the government behaves in such a manner. An implication of my tax and compensation policy is that an individual who has his property expropriated will receive its full market value as compensati...
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作者：Erard, B; Ho, CC
摘要：This paper is about 'ghosts' - individuals who fail to comply with their income tax filing requirements. As their name suggests, the identities and characteristics of these individuals are shrouded in mystery. In this paper we attempt to de-mystify the issues surrounding ghosts and examine their role in the compliance process. We begin by extending a standard model of tax evasion to account for the existence of ghosts. We then examine the empirical significance and policy relevance of our exte...
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作者：Bordignon, M; Minelli, E
作者单位：IUAV University Venice; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Brescia
摘要：Rules of allocation and redistribution in the public sector are often less contingent on available information than normative theory would suggest. This paper offers a political economy explanation. Under different rules, even if the observable outcomes of policies remain the same, the informational content which can be extracted by these observations is different. Less contingent rules allow citizens to gain more information on politicians and this improved information may be used to better s...
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作者：Figlio, DN; Rueben, KS
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：This paper examines the impact of local tax limits on new teacher quality. Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics we find that tax limits systematically reduce the average quality of education majors, as well as new public school teachers in states that have passed these limits. The average relative test scores of education majors in tax limit states declined by ten percent as compared to the relative test scores of education majors in states that did not pass limits. Thi...
