Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olsen, TE; Osmundsen, P
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Equinor; Universitetet i Stavanger; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00114-6
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 253-277
• 关键词: Tax competition; mobility; common agency

摘要

Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in the two localisations. It is shown that the distortions in the MNE's real investment portfolio are determined by a trade-off between fiscal externalities and equity externalities, and that investments in the case of strategic tax competition may be lower than in the co-operative case. Ownership matters, and we show how the firm may reduce its overall tax payments by influencing the distribution of owner shares between investors in the two countries. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.